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INTRODUCTION: THE CALL FOR A MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
Throughout 2004 President Bush called upon Congress to “promptly
pass and to send to the States for ratification an amendment to our
Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a union of man and
woman as husband and wife.”1 He claimed that the sanctity of marriage—a
fundamental, cherished institution—is under attack and subject to
annihilation if same-sex couples are allowed to join.2 The President said he
was forced to resort to the constitutional process in order to protect this
institution because “activist” judges were seeking to redefine marriage
without regard to the voice of the people.3 One may agree or disagree with
court decisions that provide equality for gay couples—like the
Massachusetts gay marriage decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health—but courts that act to foster equality are within their authority and
within accepted principles of constitutional democracy.4
The Federal Marriage Amendment (“FMA”) was introduced in Congress
on May 21, 2003.5 However, it was not until the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ruled that the state must grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples6 that President Bush publicly endorsed the FMA and Congress
actively pushed to pass it.7 In 2004, the House of Representatives failed to
approve the FMA, garnering less than the two-thirds vote required to pass.8
Nevertheless, those in favor of the FMA were in the clear majority by a
vote of 227 to 186.9 The Senate, in contrast, voted to stop the debate on the
FMA by a vote of 50 to 48.10
1. Remarks Calling for a Constitutional Amendment Defining and Protecting
Marriage, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 276, 277 (Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Remarks].
2. Id.
3. Id.; see The President’s Radio Address, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1253, 1254
(July 10, 2004) (
The union of a man and woman in marriage is the most enduring and important
human institution, and the law can teach respect or disrespect for that
institution . . . . If courts create their own arbitrary definition of marriage as a mere
legal contract and cut marriage off from its cultural, religious, and natural roots,
then the meaning of marriage is lost and the institution is weakened.
); The Courts, The Legislature, and the Executive: Separate and Equal? Questions from the
Audience, 87 JUDICATURE 208, 218 (2004) [hereinafter Questions] (“Politicians use the
word ‘activist’ when they’re upset with judges.”).
4. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that the Massachusetts state constitution forbids the denial of full legal marriage rights to
same-sex couples).
5. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the United States
Constitution that would define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman” and would
prohibit any federal or state law from requiring “that marital status or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups”).
6. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004).
7. See Remarks, supra note 1, at 277.
8. 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7934 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004).
9. Id. at H7933-34.
10. 150 CONG. REC. S8090-91 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (defeating the motion with six
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The fight is not over. The FMA was reintroduced in early 2005 after
President Bush was reelected.11 Some Americans attribute President
Bush’s reelection to the same-sex marriage controversy that divides the
country,12 citing the many states that have amended their constitutions to
deprive same-sex couples of the same right to marry as opposite-sex
couples.13 In fact, immediately following the election, the Human Rights
Campaign (HRC), a national gay rights organization, announced a change
in strategy to temper efforts to obtain marriage rights in light of the
dramatic backlash.14
Article V provides for amendments to the Constitution.15
“Amendments” are generally intended to provide sufficient flexibility such
that a document will survive over time and adjust to changing
circumstances.16 Thus, amendments to the Constitution should promote the
Republicans and all but three Democrats); Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, Justifications, Obfuscations and Wave of State Anti-Marriage Constitutional
Amendments Cloud Defeat of Federal Marriage Amendment (July 15, 2004), at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/media/release.cfm?releaseID=710 (on file with the American
University Law Review).
11. H.R.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005).
12. See Anne E. Kornblut, GOP to Press for Gay-Marriage Ban: Democrats Facing
Reelection Pressure, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2004, at A25; Kate Zernike, Groups Vow
Not to Let Losses Dash Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 30; Gary M. Segura,
A Symposium on the Politics of Same-Sex Marriage—An Introduction and Commentary, 38
PS: POL. SCI. & POLITICS 189, 189 (2005) (“[T]he emergence of the analytically vague
phrase ‘moral values’ from the exit polls and some arm-chair analysis by the pundits had
already raised to the level of conventional wisdom the assertion that Senator John Kerry had
lost
because
of
the
issue
of
same-sex
marriage.”),
available
at
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/CJFX002-Segura[001-004].pdf.
13. See Statement by Matt Foreman, Executive Director of the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Justifications,
Obfuscations and Wave of State Anti-Marriage Constitutional Amendments Cloud Defeat of
Federal
Marriage
Amendment
(July
15,
2004),
at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/media/release.cfm?releaseID=710 (on file with the American
University Law Review) (noting that the vote defeating the amendment “was far from a
ringing endorsement for equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)
people . . . . [O]ver one dozen states . . . will have State Constitutional amendments on the
ballot this November [2004].”); Unitarian Universalist Association, States Facing
Constitutional
Amendments
Banning
Same-Sex
Marriage,
at
http://www.uua.org/news/2004/freedomtomarry/state_ballot_initiative
s.html (last visited July 9, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (listing
states with constitutional amendments on the 2004 ballot, including Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah).
14. See Stefen Styrsky, Changes at Top of Human Rights Campaign: Winnie
Stachelberg Moves to Educational Foundation; David Smith Quietly Returns, GAY CITY
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2005), at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_359/changesatthetop.html (on
file with the American University Law Review); John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower
Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1; Joe Crea, HRC Restructures:
Rosen Denies Jacques’ Departure Related to November Election, N.Y. BLADE ONLINE (Dec.
10, 2004), at http://www.newyorkblade.com/2004/12-10/news/national/hrc.cfm (on file with
the American University Law Review).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
16. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
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primary purposes of the Constitution and be consistent with three of the
most basic principles articulated in the original document—individual
rights, separation of powers, and federalism.17 Although, currently, only
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that same-sex couples
have a state constitutional right to marry, the ability to enter into the
marital relationship is a very significant liberty interest, even if it does not
rise to the level of a federal constitutional right.18 The FMA tramples upon
basic notions of liberty and justice by expressly creating a secondary class
of citizens and depriving them of that fundamental interest to marry—
infringing on both equality and liberty principles. Only one amendment in
history, the Eighteenth Amendment, limited the liberty interests of the
people.19 Needless to say, it also is the only amendment to be repealed.20
Moreover, while there have been several proposed amendments that would
have limited the rights or liberty interests of individuals, these amendments
have uniformly failed.21
This Article will demonstrate that the FMA is not only strikingly similar
to these unsuccessful amendments that attempted to deprive citizens of
fundamental interests and rights, but is even more destructive of separation
of powers and federalism principles. The FMA is designed to overrule a
state supreme court decision in which the court, as the sole protector of
minority interests, acted consistently with principles of individual rights to
protect minority interests.22 While the constitutional amendment process is
the only “check” on the power of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution,
the process should be used to overrule the courts only in cases where the
judiciary abuses its power or decides a case in a manner clearly
inconsistent with constitutional principles.23
History supports this view. The Constitution has been amended only
Amended?: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 3 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
[hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION] (discussing the importance of a living, evolving
Constitution).
17. See infra Part II.
18. Throughout this Article the term “right” will be reserved for those individual
interests that the Supreme Court has recognized as a constitutional right. The term liberty
encompasses many interests, not all of which the Court has or likely will interpret as
covered expressly by the Constitution. However, when evaluating the propriety of a
constitutional amendment, an amendment that limits an important, even if not fundamental,
liberty interest should be considered suspect. Of course an amendment that infringed upon a
liberty interest found to be fundamental, for example an amendment banning abortion
nationwide, would be highly suspect.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (prohibiting the movement and
exchange of liquor within the United States).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part V (detailing how the Federal Marriage Amendment would undermine
the ability of the states to administer their own affairs).
23. See infra Part II.A.
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four times to overturn Court precedent.24 Each time the amendment was in
harmony with constitutional principles and represented a proper exercise of
the authority of the people as the ultimate sovereign to correct a court
decision inconsistent with these principles. In fact, the Supreme Court
itself has often suggested that the amendment process was the proper
means of addressing the question before it, because the Court noted that it
did not have the authority to decide the question properly.25 In contrast, the
FMA violates separation of powers principles by prematurely overruling a
state supreme court decision that is in harmony with our democratic
constitutional principles and depriving the U.S. Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to address the issue.26
Finally, the FMA flagrantly violates federalism principles by legislating
in an area left primarily to the states. The federal government is one of
limited powers. The Constitution grants the federal government no power
over marriage; the states have the exclusive power to define marriage
within their territories.27 Of course, the federal government has the power
to protect individual rights consistent with notions of due process and equal
protection.28 Thus, even in an area left exclusively to the states, the federal
government may legislate to protect individual rights and establish a
federal floor for such rights. However, the FMA deprives individuals of
significant liberty interests and establishes a federal ceiling on
constitutional rights.29 This clearly violates federalism principles and
forecloses the opportunity for progressive state experimentation, an
important aspect of our dual federal and state system.30
In sum, the FMA is itself constitutionally suspect and is more
destructive, on balance, of the three basic democratic constitutional
principles than any amendment previously adopted or proposed. The
amendment violates every tenet of constitutional democracy by: (1)
24. See infra Part IV (discussing the Eleventh Amendment, which limited the federal
judiciary’s authority over suits brought by citizens against a state; the Thirteenth and the
Fourteenth Amendments, which abolished slavery and granted citizenship to slaves; the
Sixteenth Amendment, which permitted the federal government to collect income taxes; and
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which extended voting rights to all citizens eighteen years or
older).
25. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (noting Justice Taney’s suggestion in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1856), that former slaves could only gain
citizenship through a constitutional amendment because the Court could not in good faith
read a provision into the Constitution that the legislature never intended it to include).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190 (1888), for the proposition that the states retain the primary authority to regulate
marriage).
28. See id. at 7 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for the proposition that state regulation of marriage must
comport with the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See infra Part V.
30. See infra Part V.
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expressly limiting the due process and equality interests of a minority
group; (2) precluding the Supreme Court from fulfilling its role as the
protector of individual rights; and, (3) foreclosing the states from
experimenting with progressive laws designed to promote equality within
an area uniquely reserved to the state governments. By violating these
tenets of constitutional democracy, the FMA is unlike any other
amendment in our history31 and must be rejected.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses Article V of the
Constitution and the limits placed on the constitutional amendment process,
specifically, whether the Court may find an amendment substantively
unconstitutional or require that the people, through convention, adopt
amendments that infringe on individual liberties. Part III analyzes the
Eighteenth Amendment and proposed amendments that have historically
threatened individual interests or rights, drawing parallels with the FMA.
Part IV analyzes the four amendments designed to overrule Supreme Court
decisions and contrasts these with the FMA to demonstrate that the use of
the amendment process here is inconsistent with these past amendments.
Finally, Part V discusses how the FMA flagrantly violates federalism
principles by limiting individual liberties in an area left exclusively to the
states, thereby depriving the nation of the opportunity to experiment with
progressive laws.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

A. Limits on Constitutional Amendments
Article V of the Constitution grants Congress the power to propose an
amendment to the Constitution whenever two-thirds of both houses shall
deem it necessary; and such amendment shall become valid when ratified
by the Legislatures or Conventions of three-fourths of the states.32 While
thousands of constitutional amendments have been proposed since the
founding, only seventeen amendments have been added to the original Bill
of Rights.33 The Constitution is deemed a higher law than ordinary
31. The FMA also appears to conflict with more constitutional principles than did other
proposed amendments. See infra note 122 (listing briefly categories of proposed
amendments, especially those related to marriage). See generally M.A. MUSMANNO,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 551 (2d Sess. 1929) (listing
amendments proposed to Congress since 1889); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. DOC. NO. 163 (2d Sess. 1963) (listing
all amendments submitted to Congress from 1926-1963).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
33. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 16, at 37, 49-50 (“Although more
than ten thousand amendments have been proposed, only seventeen were adopted . . . . Only
the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of senators, changed a key
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legislation; thus the amendment process requires a super-majority
consensus for passage by Congress and the states. The purpose of
requiring a slow and deliberate process is to limit the number of
amendments to those that truly reflect the will of the people.34 James
Madison explained that in a large republic “it [should be] less probable that
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens.”35 The “people” are granted the ultimate authority over
government with the power to redefine the scope of its power by modifying
the document that establishes such power.36
Whether the Constitution provides for substantive limits on amendments
is hotly debated.37 There are strong arguments that some substantive
limitations do exist.38 The word “amendment” itself suggests limits.
“[T]he power to ‘amend’ [does not] include the power to ‘destroy.’”39
“Amendment” implies change to the original document that respects its
foundational principles, those “in harmony” with the “general spirit and
purpose[s]” of the original document.40
Radical alteration to the
foundational principles is not intended.41 The Constitution contains “‘an
element of the framer’s design.”); John R. Vile, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995, 48, 251 (1996)
(detailing that six amendments have been submitted to the states but have not been ratified,
with the most recent addressing child labor, submitted in June 1924 to the states for
ratification. Interestingly, “the amendments that have been adopted are concentrated in just
a few periods in our history. The first ten amendments were ratified in 1791; two more were
added in 1798 and 1804, respectively . . . . After that, however—except for the three Civil
War Amendments, which obviously arose from extraordinary circumstances—no
amendments were adopted for almost 110 years. Then, beginning in 1913, the Constitution
was amended four times in seven years.” David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1489-90 (2001).
34. Griffin, supra note 33, at 39 (describing the uniquely American preference that
constitutional amendments be written and approved by the people).
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (New York, J. & A. McLean,
1788).
36. See William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 223, 232 (1919) (“‘The government proceeds directly from the people . . . .’”) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. 316, 402 (1819)); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-2, at 2 (2d ed. 1988) (“That all lawful power derives from the
people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom is the oldest and most central
tenet of American Constitutionalism.”).
37. See, e.g., Marbury, supra note 36; Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to
Constitutional Change?
Rawls on Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional
Amendments, and the Basis of Equality, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004); John R. Vile,
The Case Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 16, at 191, 198.
38. See generally Kelbley, supra note 37 (outlining the arguments for implicit
limitations to the amendment process including: (1) the definition of “amend” as limited to
correction, not revolution; (2) justifications based on the text, natural law, and normative
arguments; and (3) the need to interpret the Constitution holistically).
39. Marbury, supra note 36, at 225.
40. Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J.
109, 118 (1893).
41. Id.
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inner unity’ and a commitment to ‘certain overarching principles and
fundamental decisions to which individual provisions are subordinate.’”42
The preamble of the Constitution establishes the primary purposes of the
Framers—to maintain a union of independent states and secure justice and
liberty for all individuals throughout the nation.43 The body of the
Constitution creates a framework for government to achieve these
principles by defining a federal government of limited powers, dividing
power among three separate branches—the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary—and protecting individuals from government abuse.44
This framework is founded upon three substantive principles that define
our constitutional democracy: federalism, separation of powers, and
individual rights. These rights are more important than the democratic
procedures provided in Article V to secure them.45 Thus, the use of proper
procedures to amend the Constitution in a manner that contradicts
fundamental constitutional principles should be invalid.
Nevertheless, the generally accepted legal view derived from the plain
language of Article V is that the Court has no authority to question the
substance of constitutional amendments. If the procedural requirements of
Article V are properly followed, the amendment is valid.46 The reason for
this is simple. The amendment process is the sole check on judicial power
to interpret the Constitution. Thus, if the judiciary could review the
substance of constitutional amendments, it would wield unchecked ultimate
power.47 This is particularly problematic because its members are not
42. Vile, supra note 37, at 197 (citing Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional
Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 755-56 (1980), which quotes the Federal Constitutional
Court in Germany).
43. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
44. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991) (discussing how both the
creation of separate and independent branches of the government and a federalist system
that balances the power between the federal and state governments reduces the risk of
tyrrany and protects the rights of the individual); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 25
(1926) (explaining the division of power among the three branches as a means to devise a
more secure government); TRIBE, supra note 36, § 1-2, at 2-3 (relating the conceptual
understanding of the Founding Fathers that centralized power would lead to tyranny,
whereas divided power would lead to liberty).
45. Vile, supra note 37, at 197 (citing Walter Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional
Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 755-57 (1980)).
46. See, e.g., JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 173 (1992) (arguing that Article V was well-designed to ensure that
constitutional amendments truly reflect the will of the people); WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD,
THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 236 (1910); Rhode Island v.
Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). Article V specifically describes two substantive limits: one
expired in 1808 and thus is no longer applicable; the second required that each state have the
same number of representatives in the Senate. These two enumerated substantive limits
suggest that no other substantive limits were intended. Kelbley, supra note 37, at 1535.
47. See Vile, supra note 37, at 198.
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elected but rather are appointed and serve for life.48 The judiciary, in fact,
is designed to be counter-majoritarian and is not well-suited to express the
will of the “majority.”49 Therefore, it is generally understood that the
Supreme Court has no power to determine the content of the Constitution,
but only the power to interpret that which the Constitution does contain.50
The arguments supporting substantive limits on constitutional
amendments are useful in analyzing which amendments are constitutionally
suspect, even if the Court would be unwilling to enforce substantive limits.
Thus, an amendment is constitutionally suspect when it is in direct conflict
with the governing principles embodied in the original constitution, for
example when the value at stake is both expressly embodied in its text and
has strong ties to other constitutional values.51
The express purposes of the Constitution “to form a more perfect union,
establish justice . . . and secure the blessings of liberty”52 establish two
fundamental principles necessary to our constitutional system of
democracy: the “union” of individual states and individual interests in
justice and liberty. Amendments that would effectively eliminate or
destroy the states would be invalid as there would no longer remain a
“union.”53 Similarly, amendments that destroy individual interests in
liberty and justice would be invalid as incoherent and destructive to the
very purposes of establishing justice and securing liberty. It is unlikely that
any single amendment would eliminate the states or destroy all
fundamental interests necessary to maintain justice and liberty. Such
dramatic “amendments” would likely be the result of a revolution.54
However, it is plausible to imagine successive amendments that would
deprive the states of sufficient legislative powers such that over time the
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, art. III, § 1.
49. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 217.
Of course, in creating the judiciary, the Founders recognized that an interest of the
“majority” was to provide a branch that, in fact, would protect minority interests. Thus, the
role the courts play are in the interests of the “majority.” BICKEL, supra, at 16.
50. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.”) (emphasis in original). While this power is quite broad—as “interpretation”
itself involves defining what is contained—principles of “interpretation” do impose limits
on delineating that power from the power to, in effect, “create” the Constitution.
Nevertheless, as one noted commentator said many years ago, “the choice then presented to
the American people [between allowing judicial review of constitutional amendments or
not] may be one between an imperfect Constitution and no Constitution at all.” Marbury,
supra note 36, at 234.
51. See Mark E. Brandon, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment and the Limits to
Formal Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 16, at 215,
235.
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
53. Marbury, supra note 36, at 228.
54. Cooley, supra note 40, at 118.
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states would cease to exist in any real sense, having been deprived of their
primary powers.55 Moreover, one could imagine successive amendments
that chip away at individual liberty interests such that, over time, the people
would lack sufficient protections to maintain individual justice and liberty.
The FMA is constitutionally suspect. First, individual interests in liberty
and equality are expressly enumerated in the Constitution.56 The United
States Supreme Court has held that marriage is a fundamental liberty right
of the people.57 The Court has not held that same-sex couples have a right
to marry: that is the debate.58 Nevertheless, the FMA expressly creates an
unequal system that deprives only same-sex couples of the legal right to
marry, which, even if not a federal constitutional right to liberty,59 is a
significant liberty interest. Second, values of liberty and equality, and
specifically marriage, invoke other fundamental enumerated interests of
expression, assembly, and religion.60 Third, the power to define marriage
lies primarily with the states.61 Setting a national standard for marriage that
denies individual liberty interests is a move toward eliminating both state
sovereignty and individual justice and liberty. In sum, the FMA should be
invalidated as it impinges upon the substantive limits of “amendment.”
B. Constitutional Amendment by Convention
While it may be improper to give the judicial branch ultimate authority
over the content of the Constitution, no branch should have such authority
alone. To give any one branch this authority violates the basic structure of
55. Marbury, supra note 36, at 229.
56. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (stating that an individual shall not be “deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law”).
57. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that marriage is a
fundamental civil right of every person); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(extending the fundamental right of marriage to interracial marriage).
58. The question has been analyzed by scholars for several years and is beyond the
scope of this Article. E.g., ANDREW SULLIVAN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON
(1997); MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1997); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997). In 2003 the Supreme Court
held that criminalizing sodomy is unconstitutional. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the majority decision would inevitably lead to
a finding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). This argument is debatable, but at the very least Lawrence offers support for
a right for same-sex couples to marry. Had the Court instead upheld Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), the argument for a right for same-sex couples to marry would have
been all but destroyed.
59. Note that the Court has held that two consenting adults have a liberty right to
engage in sodomy in private. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
60. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(finding a constitutional violation of a prospective employee’s rights to free speech and
association when a government employer withdrew a job offer after learning the employee
planned a wedding ceremony to marry her same-sex partner).
61. See infra notes 234-236.
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checks and balances. Rather, the people created our constitutional
democratic government during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and
should alone retain the ultimate authority to substantially alter the
document in a manner that is inconsistent with the basic principles defined
therein. The people’s will is expressed through convention, not by votes of
Congress or the state legislatures. “‘[C]onstitutionalism has one essential
quality: it is a legal limitation on government’ . . . written by a special
assembly of citizens and then submitted to the people for approval.”62
Only the people have the authority to approve an amendment that limits the
natural interests of the people themselves: the people, not the government,
are the ultimate sovereign.63 This proposition is supported by analogy to
the Seventeenth Amendment,64 and by state courts, scholars, and politicians
throughout history who have agreed with this view.65
The people elect representatives to the state and federal legislatures.
Once elected, these representatives form the “government” and are no
longer truly the “people.” The Seventeenth Amendment exemplifies this
understanding. The Constitution originally provided that “[t]he Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislatures thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall
have one vote.”66 The Seventeenth Amendment requires that senators be
“elected by the people” of the state rather than “by the Legislatures
thereof.”67
A primary reason for the election of senators by the state legislatures was
to protect the interests of the states directly.68 Madison explained that
because “[t]he Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the
State Legislatures,” it “will owe its existence more or less to the favor of
State governments . . . .”69 Thus, the Senate stood as a defense to federal
62. Griffin, supra note 33, at 39 (quoting CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 24 (1940)).
63. See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1084-85 (1991).
64. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing the process by which Senators—who
would vote to pass constitutional amendments—are elected by the people of the respective
states as representatives of the people rather than of the legislatures).
65. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516-18 (1997).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
68. See Bybee, supra note 65, at 511 (discussing the prevailing philosophies at the
Constitutional Convention for allowing state legislatures to elect senators: (1) Elbridge
Gerry suggested that the legislatures would elect upper class representatives like themselves,
which would benefit the mercantile and commercial classes, and (2) George Mason urged
that states needed to guard against the increasingly powerful federal government).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 252 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole, ed., 2004) (
The senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the state legislatures.
Even the house of representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will
be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence
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encroachment upon states’ rights70 because the senators, since elected by
the state legislatures and not the people directly, would be dedicated to
protecting their respective states. Implicit in this rationale is that state
legislatures, while representatives of the people, primarily protect the
interests of the State and only indirectly those of the people.
The people soon became dissatisfied with the indirect election of their
federal senators. The primary justification was the populist and progressive
sentiment that the Senate was an aristocratic body, far removed from the
people and unresponsive to their needs.71 Furthermore, the people felt
intelligent enough to choose their own representatives.72 The predominant
sentiment among the press, the states, and the legislators was that popular
election of senators would strengthen democracy and weaken elitism.73
Giving the people power to elect their senators directly was thus a victory
for democratic forces.
State courts have recognized limits on the power of the government to
amend their constitutions. For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
has held that the Arkansas General Assembly had no power to repeal any
aspect of the Bill of Rights of the Arkansas Constitution.74 The court
explained that the Bill of Rights derived from a British statute that declared
the true rights of the British subjects. The codification of citizens’ rights
operated as a limit on the powers of the crown.75 The court explained that
the rights are sacred not only because of their antiquity, but also because
our forefathers obtained them as a result of the perpetual struggle for

over the people obtains for themselves an election into the state legislatures. Thus,
each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence
more or less to the favor of the state governments, and must consequently feel a
dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than
too overbearing towards them.
).
70. See Bybee, supra note 65, at 517 (explaining the delegates’ defensive theory that
states could frustrate Congress, if the need arose, by refusing to pay or to send their
senators).
71. See id. at 545 (recounting the populist argument that senators needed to have a
keener sense of responsibility to their constituents); Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of
Constitutional Democracy:
Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth
Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 708 (1999) (stating that people associated election
by legislature with corruption and stalemate, while popular election inspired notions of
democracy and progress).
72. See Bybee, supra note 65, at 545 (noting that the progressives and populists
considered election by legislature anachronistic, as the state legislatures experienced
turnover three times during a senator’s six-year term).
73. See Rossum, supra note 71, at 711-12 (adding that discussion over ratification of
the Seventeenth Amendment also focused on eliminating political corruption and freeing
states from the burden of election).
74. See Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481, 1851 WL 463, at *5 (1851).
75. See id. at *6 (explaining that the Bill of Rights protected citizens from all
government encroachment into the enumerated rights).
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freedom.76 As part of the original state constitution, the Framers placed
these rights beyond the power of the general government to oppress the
people.77 Thus, only a convention of the whole people, not the legislature,
could amend the Arkansas Constitution to alter the sacred rights of the
people.78 Similarly, at the federal level, if an amendment will alter sacred
rights of the people, the people, by convention, should amend the federal
constitution, not the congress and state legislatures.
Scholars have argued that use of the convention method for adoption and
ratification is necessary when the proposed amendment makes fundamental
changes to the Constitution, especially when the amendment will deprive
the people of individual liberty interests. Elai Katz explained his position
in this way:
A convention called for the express purpose of amending the
Constitution would reflect the will of the people regarding the specific
matter at hand better than legislatures that may have been elected before
the public became aware of the proposed amendment. While delegates
to the convention would be selected based on their position on a single
issue, such as the right to an abortion, legislators are rarely elected
because of their views regarding a single issue.
In the eighteenth century, conventions were considered to be the highest
expression of popular will; they embodied popular sovereignty . . .
. Thus, in the eyes of eighteenth century society and possibly present
society, a special convention, convened for the purpose of revising the
fundamental law, would be the best substitute for an act of pure popular
sovereignty.
Furthermore, conventions require a longer, more
deliberative, and better publicized process.
Since constitutional
conventions are not permanent, ordinary organizations, their selection
and debates are likely to be followed more carefully by the public than
regular congressional sessions. Finally, delegates to conventions are
elected for one particular issue—to support or propose an
amendment; . . . It follows, then, that a principle-altering amendment
proposed and ratified by conventions is more legitimate than the same
amendment proposed by members of Congress who were not elected for
the express purpose of making particular changes to the fundamental
law.79

Furthermore, throughout history, politicians have argued that the use of
conventions for approving and ratifying fundamental changes to our
76. Id.
77. See Cooley, supra note 40, at 112 (suggesting that the Bill of Rights prevented the
government from being able to seriously oppress an individual).
78. Eason, 1851 WL 463 at *7.
79. Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions:
The Legality and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 287-88 (1996) (citations
omitted).
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Constitution is necessary. For example, President Abraham Lincoln stated
that a constitutional amendment that could potentially alter the “character
of the Constitution,” should be adopted by convention because “it allows
amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only
permitting them to take, or reject, propositions, originated by others.”80
However, the plain text of the Constitution enumerates four procedures
for constitutional amendment81 and thus far the Supreme Court has held all
methods equal.82 For example, in Sprague, the Court found that the Tenth
Amendment did not require state conventions for ratification of
amendments affecting the liberty of citizens.83 The Court held that the
Tenth Amendment reserves powers that are not granted to the federal
government to the states or the people to protect federalism principles, not
individual rights.84
Interestingly, Ely Hart has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment may
grant courts the power to require selection of a specific procedure to amend
the Constitution under certain circumstances.
Hart’s vision of a
representative democracy invokes two features: broad participation of the
people in the political process and protection of discrete minorities.85
According to Hart, the Founders understood the duty of representatives to
govern in the interest of the whole people. Representatives could not,
therefore, refuse to represent a particular group.86 Under this theory, the
Supreme Court has a right to review the states’ Article V activities to make
80. Id. at 281 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 270 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)). President
Lincoln was commenting on the proposed Corwin Amendment. See infra Part II.D. Also,
nineteen resolutions were introduced in Congress between 1917 and 1928 to amend the
Constitution requiring a popular ratification of all proposed amendments. See MUSMANNO,
supra note 31, at 199-204. Most recently, during consideration of the flag-burning
amendment, critics recognized that only the people retained the power to adopt a
constitutional amendment that violated fundamental constitutional norms, arguing that the
amendment would have to be approved and ratified by convention, not by Congress or the
state legislatures. Eric Isaacson, The Flag Burning Issue: A Legal Analysis and Comment,
23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 535, 599 (1990).
81. See Isaacson, supra note 80, at 589 (detailing that Article V allows for the following
procedures for amending the Constitution: (1) approval by two-thirds of each house of
Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures; (2) approval by twothirds of each house and ratification by constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the
states; (3) approval by a national constitutional convention and ratification by three-fourths
of the state legislatures; and (4) approval by a national constitutional convention and
ratification by constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the states).
82. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (relying on the Framers’
silence regarding limitations on ratification procedures as authority for continuing to allow
Congress to exercise discretion in choosing how to ratify an amendment).
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id. at 733.
85. See David Castro, A Constitutional Convention: Scouting Article V’s Undiscovered
Country, 134 U. PENN. L. REV. 939, 945 (1986) (accepting John Ely’s theory of virtual
democracy).
86. Id.

SCHAFFNER OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

2/24/2006 2:46:34 PM

THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

1501

sure that they comport with the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Thus, the
ratification process used by a state may fall short of Fourteenth
Amendment standards, for instance, if the legislators did not adhere to their
duty of representation.88
The arguments detailing the need for popular approval by convention
when an amendment infringes fundamental interests suggests that the FMA
should be ratified, if at all, by convention. The FMA limits natural
interests that the people have in liberty, freedom, and equality, thus only
the people by convention, should have the authority to approve it, as they,
not the government, are the ultimate sovereign.89
Moreover, because a constitutional amendment is by far the most
important and substantial legal step this country can take, it should be taken
only after serious unbiased consideration and reflection by the electorate.
A controversial amendment proposed in a time of political unrest is
unlikely to withstand the test of time. Citizens will become dissatisfied
with such an amendment once they have an opportunity to reflect upon it,90
as demonstrated by the Eighteenth Amendment.91 The FMA was
introduced at a time when this country was at war, having been attacked by
terrorists, and in the midst of a presidential election. Support for the
amendment was fueled by the political fervor of an election where
candidates capitalized on the irrational fears and prejudices of the
electorate to create a divided polity and gain votes.92 This is not an
appropriate environment for proposing a controversial constitutional
amendment since the people have little opportunity in such a environment
to reflect carefully on the ramifications of the amendment.
II. AMENDMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Independent of the procedural requirements of constitutional
amendment, the FMA, unlike any other amendment in our history,
substantively violates the basic tenets of our constitutional democracy:
individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism principles. The Bill

87. Id. at 965.
88. See id. (“[I]t could be argued that an amendment repealing the Fifteenth
Amendment was invalid on the grounds that the legislators had purposely discriminated
against the interests of their minority constituents in ratifying the amendment.”).
89. See Rosen, supra note 63, at 1084-85.
90. See Griffin, supra note 33, at 39.
91. The Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment less
than fifteen years after its enactment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
92. See Alan Bjerga, Sides Clash Over Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WICHITA EAGLE, Dec.
29, 2003, at 1A (reporting that critics argue that the FMA would not be an issue but for the
2004 presidential election).
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of Rights,93 and later Amendments adopted by this nation, enumerate
fundamental rights and protect these rights from undue government
infringement. The Ninth Amendment further protects non-enumerated
rights by stating that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”94 The right to “liberty” and the right to “equal protection” under
the laws are granted expressly to the people under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments95 and reflect the very principles upon which this nation was
founded.
The debate over same-sex marriage raises individual interests in both
fundamental rights: (1) “liberty”—the right for same-sex couples to have
the state recognize a committed monogamous relationship between two
individuals and bestow the benefits and obligations of this civil institution
upon them; and (2) “equality”—the right for same-sex couples to be
eligible for the same benefits and recognition as opposite-sex couples who
agree to abide by the obligations imposed by the civil institution of
marriage. Amending the federal Constitution to define marriage as
between a man and a woman deprives same-sex couples the ability to
marry and is antithetical to principles of liberty and equality. Granted,
same-sex couples currently have no federal constitutional right to marry
but the interest in marriage is an extremely important, if not fundamental,
one.
A. The Repealed Eighteenth Amendment
Only one amendment, the Eighteenth, deprived individuals of a liberty
interest. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within the United States.96 Needless
to say, it is the only constitutional amendment to be repealed.97 The
Eighteenth Amendment grew out of the efforts of the temperance
movement, primarily motivated by religious Christian groups. Temperance
urged moderation in the consumption of alcohol so as to reduce its
corrupting influence on public and private morals.98
The struggle to prohibit alcoholic consumption first targeted the states.99
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (“The eighteenth
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed”).
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
98. See Richard Hamm, Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Unintended
Consequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, in UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 164, 166 (2000) [hereinafter UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES].
99. See id. at 167.
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In fact, the federal courts limited the scope of certain state prohibition laws
to protect Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.100 By 1912,
however, nearly half the states had adopted prohibition laws.101 In 1914,
the movement took the struggle to the national level, proposing a federal
constitutional amendment to prohibit the sale and transportation of alcohol
nationwide.102 The amendment was ultimately ratified by the states in
1919, primarily in reaction to World War I.103 Food shortages had led to
conservation and prohibitionists argued that alcohol led to the waste of
precious resources.104 Further, anti-German sentiment was directed, in part,
at the brewery industry, which was largely run by those of German
descent.105
After adoption, the Eighteenth Amendment suffered from several
problems.106 These problems have been explained as a result of an
amendment passed by a small, yet highly organized and passionate interest
group.107 Because the Eighteenth Amendment did not appear to reflect true
popular sentiment, people were not willing to voluntarily conform to the
law and enforcement was very difficult.108 Moreover, organized crime
stepped in to meet the popular demand109 and drinking, in fact, increased
among portions of the polity. For example, women, who had been banned
previously from saloons under state law, drank in newly established venues
for alcoholic consumption.110
The Eighteenth Amendment was criticized by reform movement
organizations arguing the amendment “promoted hypocrisy, encouraged
law breaking, destroyed the balance of power between state and federal
authority, and impaired individual rights.”111 These groups claimed that the
100. See id. at 167-68.
101. See id. at 169.
102. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
99TH CONG., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 49-50
[hereinafter AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION].
103. See id. at 50.
104. See id. at 50-51.
105. See id.
106. See generally Hamm, supra note 98, at 173-82 (noting several problems with the
Eighteenth Amendment: widespread noncompliance; the rise of criminal racketeering to
satisfy the demand for alcohol; increase in alcoholic consumption among women; and the
unwillingness of states to appropriate resources to enforce compliance).
107. See David Kyvig, Arranging for Amendment:
Unintended Outcomes of
Constitutional Design, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 98, at 9, 37 (including in
its list of interest groups the Prohibition Party, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union,
and the Anti-Saloon League of America).
108. See id.
109. Hamm, supra note 98, at 173.
110. See Kyvig, supra note 107, at 37 (including nightclubs, cabarets, and speakeasies).
111. Hamm, supra note 98, at 183 (listing the leading reform organizations responsible
for shaping public debate regarding anti-prohibition: the Association Against the
Prohibition Amendment, the Voluntary Committee of Lawyers, and the Women’s
Prohibition Reform Group).
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amendment advanced unsupported social views and invaded the states’
sphere of power. The reformers perceived prohibition as a direct threat to
state authority and local autonomy.112 Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey of
Texas thought that proposing a national solution to a social problem set
dangerous precedent. Bailey worried that such a proposal would lead to
national marriage laws, which would ultimately erase state lines and
subvert the republic.113
Interestingly, the amendment drafters attempted to limit the threat to
federalism principles and individual rights by allowing for concurrent state
and federal enforcement of the laws and not outlawing the personal use of
While the interpretation of “concurrent powers” was
alcohol.114
controversial, the Court settled the meaning by holding that, while states
could not pass laws that conflicted with the federal amendment, there was
no requirement for them to enact supplemental prohibition codes.115
Moreover, strong beliefs in personal liberty and the sanctity of the home
supported leaving the personal use of alcohol unaffected by the
amendment.116
The parallels between the FMA and the Eighteenth Amendment are
striking. First, the movement to outlaw same-sex marriage nationwide is
primarily led by conservative politicians and Christian religious groups.
Like the Eighteenth Amendment, the FMA is meant to protect the
“morality” of our society.117 Admittedly, the marriage amendment is more
popular with the polity than was prohibition118 This is not surprising since
112. Id.; RICHARD HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT 231 (Univ. of North
Carolina Press 1995).
113. See Hamm, supra note 98, at 230 (detailing that, in particular, the senator was
concerned that allowing national laws to set social policy would result in the elimination of
state anti-miscegenation laws).
114. Id. at 232-33.
115. Id. at 250.
116. Id. at 223.
117. See Matthew Spalding, In Defense Of Marriage (WebMemo #373), at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/wm373.cfm? (Nov. 19, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (arguing that same-sex marriage will weaken the
institution of marriage by raising non-marital unions to the status of marriage and lowering
traditional marriage to “merely one form of household”); Robert Benne & Gerald
McDermott, Speaking Out: Why Gay Marriage Would be Harmful, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
(Feb. 19, 2004), at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct
/2004/107/41.0.html (on file with the American University Law Review) (citing three
negative effects of gay marriage: (1) a scrambling of the definition of marriage; (2) the
harming of children; and (3) an introduction of instability into marriage and family life).
See generally The Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org (last visited Aug. 2,
2005).
118. See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Gay Marriage Debate Still Fierce Over One Year Later,
USA TODAY, May 16, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-0516-gay-marriage_x.htm (noting that fifty-six percent of those polled are opposed to gay
marriage); PollingReport.com, Law and Civil Rights, at http://www.pollingreport.
com/civil.htm (last visited July 19, 2005) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (publishing Boston Globe poll results finding that fifty percent of those polled
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it affects only a small subgroup of the citizenry, a subgroup that has long
suffered prejudice by the majority. Second, both amendments establish a
national solution to a social problem over which there is no clear
agreement. Rather than allow the states to deal with the issue separately as
contemplated by the Constitution, the FMA imposes a uniform law on all
states without any “concurrent” powers granted to the states. In fact, the
marriage amendment is more intrusive of state powers than the Eighteenth
Amendment. Whereas the interstate commerce clause grants power to
Congress to regulate sales and transportation of alcohol across state lines,
there is no similar Congressional power over domestic relations. In fact,
Senator Bailey’s concern raised at the time of the Eighteenth Amendment
has been realized—the FMA is a national marriage law!
Third, as to personal liberty, the FMA is far more intrusive than the
Eighteenth Amendment. Citizens do not have a fundamental right to
consume alcohol.119 In fact, the liberty interest in consuming alcohol is
relatively insignificant. Yet the Eighteenth Amendment left personal use
unaffected in order to protect personal liberty interests. The Court has
held, however, that citizens do have a fundamental right to marry.120 The
FMA defines a class of unpopular individuals and deprives them of the
ability to marry another of the same sex. Although same-sex marriage may
not rise to a fundamental federal constitutional right, it certainly raises a
fundamental interest more important than the interest to consume alcohol.
Finally, while support for the Eighteenth Amendment was largely fueled
by hatred for and prejudice against German descendants, it did not target
Germans or German descendants specifically. Likewise, the marriage
amendment is likely to be largely fueled by prejudice against gay
Americans.121 The FMA is far worse than the Eighteenth Amendment,
disapprove of same-sex marriage). But see Jennifer Harper, More Americans Oppose Gay
'Marriage,' Poll Finds, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting that sixty-eight percent
of people polled think same-sex marriage should not be recognized), available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=2005040
1-114205-2153r.
119. See, e.g., DFW Vending, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 991 F. Supp. 578, 598 (E.D. Tex.
1998) (dismissing the right to consume alcohol as fundamental); Felix v. Milliken, 462 F.
Supp. 1360, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Republican Coll. Council of Pa. v. Winner, 357 F.
Supp. 739, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
120. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (declaring that prison inmates
retain the fundamental right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)
(reaffirming that the right to marry is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation statute on the grounds that it deprived people of one
of the “‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”).
121. The rhetoric used by the conservatives to support the amendment avoided
suggesting their motive was prejudice against gay americans. Paul Varnell, Changing
Rhetoric on Gay Marriage, CHICAGO FREE PRESS, June 22, 2005, available at
http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/varnell/varnell157.html (“[O]ne of the most
interesting aspects of last year’s Senate debate on the so-called Federal Marriage
Amendment was the relative absence of overt criticism of gays and lesbians and their
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however, because it specifically targets a discrete subgroup, expressly
drafting prejudice in the Constitution.
B. The Proposed Anti-Miscegenation Amendment
There have been several proposed amendments that would have deprived
individuals of fundamental constitutional rights or interests; however, no
other amendment so flagrantly violates all three basic tenets of our
constitution as does the FMA.122 The most direct parallel with the marriage
amendment was the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment. For many
years, states outlawed marriage between individuals of different races
through anti-miscegenation statutes.123 Nevertheless, early in the twentieth
century, a renowned black boxer named Jack Johnson garnered much
publicity when he married a white woman, Lucille Cameron.124 The
thought of “a brutal African prizefighter” marrying a white woman enraged
relationships. Instead, amendment supporters focused primarily on how the amendment
would solidify the association of parenthood with marriage and would benefit children by
assuring them an optimal family of two opposite sex parents.”). However, motives may be
unstated, especially if they would detract from the message. See id. (Varnell suggests that
the stated rationale is likely disingenuous stating “[a]s Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) expressed
it, however disingenuously, ‘This amendment is not about prejudice. It is about
safeguarding the best environment for our children.’”). Moreover, the stated motives are not
adequately supported. In this age of technology, there are a variety of ways for couples to
have children, a husband and wife are not necessary, and given that many gay couples are
parents, allowing gays to marry would not seriously detract from the purported association
of parenthood and marriage. Further, there is little, if any uncontroverted evidence that
children are necessarily benefited by opposite-sex parents. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996).
122. During a brief review of a compilation of proposed amendments to the Constitution
between 1889 and 1929, no single amendment appears to violate all three basic tenets of
Constitutional democratic principles as flagrantly as the Federal Marriage Amendment. The
author grouped the proposed amendments into various categories. Those affecting the form
of government (focusing primarily on procedural changes, term changes, etc.), the powers of
the government (the most substantive of the proposed amendments, which focused on
various powers including war powers, federal taxation, question of aliens, territorial powers,
etc.), and the procedure of constitutional amendments (altering ratification procedures, time
for ratification, etc.). See MUSMANNO, supra note 31, at vii-x. Those that are most closely
on point are those involving marriage, divorce, miscegenation, and prohibition of polygamy.
Id. at 104-08, 131-35; see infra Parts II.B-C.
123. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (noting the fifteen states, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisianna, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia, which still had anti-miscegenation
statutes or constitutional provisions in force in 1967 (citing ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 102, ALA.
CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. CODE ANN. § 55-104 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
101 (1953); FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 24, FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 53106 (1961); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79 (1950);
MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263, MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1956); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.020
(1966); N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 8, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, §
12 (1965); S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 33, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7 (1962); TENN. CONST. art. 11, §
14, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1955); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN 492 (Vernon 1952); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 4697 (1961)).
124. Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of the Black Community, 32
AKRON L. REV. 529, 546 (1999).
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Congressman Seaborn Roddenberry of Georgia so much that he proposed a
constitutional
amendment
prohibiting
interracial
marriages.125
Roddenberry believed that his amendment was necessary to protect white
women because “[n]o more voracious parasite ever sucked at the heart of
pure society, innocent girlhood, or Caucasian motherhood than the one
which welcomes and recognizes the sacred ties of wedlock between Africa
and America.”126 White Americans lacked the enthusiasm to enact the
amendment, and the amendment garnered little support among the black
community.127 The amendment proposed to ban interracial marriage was
never enacted into law.
The parallels with the FMA are obvious. The FMA seeks to deprive
same-sex couples from marrying in the same manner that the antimiscegenation amendment sought to deprive individuals of different races
from marrying. The support for both amendments is grounded in prejudice
and infringes upon the states’ power to define marriage, a state
institution.128 At the time the anti-miscegenation amendment failed, the
Court had not yet held that interracial couples had a constitutional right to
marry. Instead, the states were left to legislate independently. Several
decades later, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia held that interracial
couples have a constitutional right to marry.129 Therefore, the FMA also
must fail so that the states may retain the freedom to legislate
independently, and allow the U.S. Supreme Court to ultimately resolve the
debate concerning the individual liberty interests of this minority group.

125. See id. at 549 n.78 (citing 69 CONG. REC. 503 (1912) (statement of Rep.
Roddenberry) (stating “[t]hat intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and
Caucasians or any other character of persons with the United States . . . is forever
prohibited.”)).
126. Morgan, supra note 124, at 549. However, because the amendment prohibited both
voluntary and coercive interracial relationships, it actually would have constrained a white
woman’s free choice of sexual partners and further protected the white man’s exclusive
access to them. Id.
127. See id. at 550-51 (drawing upon the writings of W.E.B. DuBois to summarize the
negative opinion of this proposed amendment in the black community). DuBois wrote:
[T]hat anti-miscegenation legislation should be opposed, not because race had no
significance, but because such laws treated blackness as if it were a physical taint,
because sex out of wedlock was morally repugnant, and because such laws “leave
the colored girl absolutely helpless before the lust of white men.”
Id. (quoting THE CRISIS, Feb. 1913, at 180).
128. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (holding that a state has an
“absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation . . . shall be
created.”). But see Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 189, 207-08 (2004) (concluding that the idea that states have
control over the definition and control of marriage is no longer accurate given recent
Supreme Court decisions that limit states and federal legislation meant to curtail the states’
power in this area).
129. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing the decision of whether a
person wishes to marry a person of another race as being an individual one upon which the
state cannot infringe).
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C. The Proposed Anti-Divorce Amendment
The Progressive era bore another social reform movement to change the
divorce laws throughout the nation.130 This movement shared many of the
same characteristics of the prohibition movement.131 In fact, just as the
prohibition movement divided society in its time, the issue of divorce
created two conflicting movements: one seeking to restrict divorce and one
seeking to make divorce more accessible.132 The traditionalists saw divorce
as “an attack on the sacred nature of marriage” and believed that, by
making the practice of divorce more difficult, they would be protecting the
morality of people.133 On the other hand, more liberal states expanded
upon the grounds for divorce.134 Due to variations among the states about
the acceptable grounds for divorce, however, citizens of a more restrictive
state would often migrate to a state with more open divorce laws.135 The
ability of citizens to escape the restrictive divorce law states prompted the
divorce reform movement which portrayed divorce as “a danger to
American civilization.”136 One notable reformer, Theodore Woolsey, the
first chief officer of the New England Divorce Reform League and former
president of Yale University, “compared the U.S. to Rome and warned that
the nation would repeat the empire’s fate if it continued to allow ‘connubial
unfaithfulness and divorce’ to increase. Keeping ‘family life pure and
simple’ was the key to preserving the nation’s ‘present political forms.’”137
The reformers introduced the first constitutional amendment in 1884
which resurfaced for the next sixty years although it never passed.138
Congress was worried about the consequences of allowing the federal
government to have authority over marriage relations.139 Moreover, it was
130. See Hamm, supra note 98, at 257 (contending that, even though it is generally
thought of as a regulationist reform movement, the divorce reform shared many
characteristics with progressive movements including the fact that it began in the 1880s and
continued through the progressive era).
131. See id. (concluding that the supporters of both the divorce reform movement and the
prohibition movement “came from the same social background and shared fundamental
assumptions about society”).
132. See id. at 258 (“[b]efore the Civil War, two competing forces, a restrictive tradition
that virtually prohibited divorce and a popular desire for easier divorce, pulled the American
polity in different directions over the issue . . . . ”).
133. Id.
134. See id. (citing cruelty, misconduct, or long imprisonment as some of the newly
accepted justifications for divorce in addition to adultery).
135. See id. (classifying this practice as “migratory divorce”). Many western states such
as Indiana and Nevada were particularly popular for those seeking divorce. In fact, divorce
lawyers from these states opened offices in New York to facilitate this process. Id.
136. Hamm, supra note 98, at 259.
137. Id.
138. See id. (noting that most of these proposals never even left committee).
139. See id. (observing that southern congressmen in particular, despite support for
restricting the ability of married couples to divorce, were concerned that any federal
legislation on divorce would lead to federal legislation that legitimated interracial
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particularly difficult to build a national consensus about what grounds
would be proper for granting divorce. The Supreme Court mostly stayed
out of the issue of divorce except for allowing the states broad latitude in
refusing to accept out-of-state divorces.140 Although this led to uncertainty,
it also led to a proliferation of divorce-mill jurisdictions and, with these
jurisdictions available, the movement remained divided and never
succeeded in making divorce a national issue.141
The parallels with the FMA are apparent. Similar constituencies are
claiming the need to protect the institution of marriage and the nation from
moral destruction by adopting a federal solution to a state problem about
which individuals disagree. The marriage amendment, however, is more
egregious in that it targets only a small minority of citizens, unlike the
divorce amendment that would have limited all citizens from seeking
divorce. Ironically, if saving marriage is the real concern, it seems much
more threatening to the marital institution to allow couples to exit easily
than it is to allow more couples to enter.
Moreover, this issue of migratory marriage is likely to be more
threatening to the conservative “moral majority,” than were migratory
divorces at the time of the anti-divorce amendment. This is because the
recognition of same-sex couples, even if only by certain states, signals
acceptance of homosexual conduct, a concept still repugnant to many
people today. For sixty years the Congress was unwilling to expand federal
authority over marital relations by setting a national standard for divorce.
A principled consistency would inevitably dictate a congressional refusal to
expand federal authority over marital relations when the object is to deprive
individuals the ability to marry.
D. The Proposed Corwin Amendment
A third proposed amendment that violated principles of liberty and
equality was the Corwin Amendment.142 The amendment read: “No
marriages). Furthermore, these congressmen, based on the same fear of the legitimization of
interracial marriages, argued that a federal law without an amendment would be
unconstitutional. Id.
140. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 605-06 (1906) (holding that a divorce that
was decreed in Connecticut when the wife was a citizen of New York does not need to
necessarily be recognized by the state of New York under the full faith and credit clause);
see also Hamm, supra note 98, at 260 (arguing that this approach produced mixed results
since, in theory, as long as a divorced couple did not try to remarry in a restrictive state,
there was nothing that a state could do to question whether a divorce in another state was
recognized or not).
141. See Hamm, supra note 98, at 260 (alleging that, because liberal jurisdictions had
created a type of tourist industry with the draw being their divorce laws and more
conservative jurisdictions could preserve the strict divorce laws in their states, there was no
way to come to a national consensus on the issue).
142. See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
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Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give
to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the
domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or
service by the laws of that State.”143 Thankfully, we can look back with
the knowledge that the amendment was not enacted (although the Civil
War did follow), and today likely all would agree that such an amendment
would be considered despicable.144 However, at the time of the proposed
amendment, such an argument was not so apparent.145
First, slavery was consistent with the text of the Constitution as it was
understood at its adoption and throughout the 1800s. Jefferson himself, at
the time of the founding, acknowledged that slavery was protected under
the Constitution146 and while sentiments had changed over time, there still
existed a strong commitment among several states to uphold the rights of
slaveholders. President Lincoln, who opposed slavery on moral grounds
and opposed extending it to new territories, “had never opposed its
maintenance in those jurisdictions where it already existed.”147 In his First
Inaugural Address, he commented on the then pending Corwin
Amendment. He stated that he did not object to making explicit that the
individual states possess control over their domestic institutions, exclusive
of federal interference, that he did not object to such a provision being
made irrevocable, and that such a provision was probably unnecessary
inasmuch as it was already then “implied constitutional law.”148
Second, while the language of the amendment referenced state “domestic
policy,” slavery was a business. Slave holders argued that slaves were
rightfully their property.149 It follows then, at least under today’s
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2046-47
(2003) (stating that the Corwin Amendment was the original language of the Thirteenth
Amendment prior to the start of the Civil War (citing CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess.
1284 (1861)).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 2047 (describing how the Corwin Amendment was the only pre-Civil War
proposal dealing with the issue of slavery to pass both houses of Congress). Furthermore,
the amendment was signed by President Buchanan, supported by Abraham Lincoln, and sent
to the states for ratification. However, the compromise amendment was discarded once the
Civil War began. Id. at 2047-48.
145. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and
“Irrevocable” Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 501, 512-34 (2003)
(presenting the historical context and the debate surrounding the Corwin Amendment and
describing how this amendment was really an attempt to prevent the secession that
eventually occurred and led to the Civil War).
146. Brandon, supra note 51, at 233.
147. Id. at 234.
148. Id.
149. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1856) (summarizing the defendant’s
plea which contains the allegations that, because the plaintiff was a “negro slave,” he was
the “lawful property” of the defendant who therefore has a right to restrain him); see also
Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 191,
239 (2003) (pointing out that, in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia,
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interpretation, that because the property interests substantially affect
interstate commerce, it would be appropriate for the federal government to
legislate in this area pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.150
Third, although the amendment clearly violated individual rights, the
individuals affected were not then considered citizens of the United
States.151 Fourth, the amendment did comport with basic federalism
principles. It did not require all states to conform to one standard, to adopt
or reject slavery. Instead it protected the states from federal interference in
their domestic affairs, allowing the states to decide how to treat slavery
within their borders. Finally, the amendment was consistent with Court
doctrine of the day, which upheld slavery, and thus was not an attempt to
usurp judicial authority or violate separation of powers principles.152
In contrast to the proposed marriage amendment, even the Corwin
Amendment—a proposal that we today recognize as deplorable—would
have been less destructive of fundamental constitutional principles than the
FMA. First, the Constitution is silent on the issue of marriages and
therefore it is a power left to the states (and the people), even though at the
time of the constitutional convention, same-sex marriages were not
contemplated. By contrast, slavery was generally accepted by the Framers
and was, in fact, protected by the Constitution.153 Second, the FMA
legislates in an area uniquely left to the states, whereas the Corwin
Amendment targeted domestic affairs involving property rights and thus
could arguably fall within the federal commerce power.154 Third, the FMA
specifically targets and deprives U.S. citizens of their interests in liberty

Maryland, and other southern states, property taxes on slaves constituted the largest portion
of state property tax income).
150. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1176
(1995) (concluding that the formulation set forth in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)—where the Court held that Congress’s commerce power allowed the Federal
Government to regulate the amount of wheat grown for personal use—would surely have
placed slavery within the reach of Congress’s commerce power). But see Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 505-06 (1841) (McLean, J., concurring) (concluding that the federal
government had no power under Article 1, § 8 to regulate the interstate trade of slaves, but
rather states had the exclusive power to regulate the interstate slave trade).
151. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406 (holding that a former slave cannot be made a citizen
of Missouri or any other state and, therefore a former slave is not a citizen of the United
States and does not have the right to file suit in federal courts).
152. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1850) (holding that the laws of each
individual state, and not the laws of other states, determine whether one is a slave); see also
Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 215 (1836) (affirming that, although
slavery may be “contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity and sound
policy,” slavery is not contrary to the laws of the nation and thus states are bound to respect
each other’s slavery laws).
153. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that, based on the more
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, federal regulation of slavery would have
been within Congress’s powers).
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and equality, unlike the Corwin Amendment that targeted non-citizens.155
Fourth, the FMA violates federalism principles by binding all states to one
national standard. The Corwin Amendment, on the other hand, limited
federal power to interfere with the states and allowed them to make their
own decision regarding slavery. Finally, the marriage amendment is fueled
by a desire to overturn state judicial precedent expanding individual rights
to marry, whereas the Corwin Amendment was consistent with judicial
precedent of its day.156
Like our modern-day reaction to the Corwin Amendment, it is likely that
years from now, our descendants will read about the marriage amendment
and be equally surprised and saddened at how an enlightened society could
consider drafting such prejudice into such a cherished document, violating
the three basic principles for which the Constitution stands.
E. The Proposed Flag-Burning Amendment
One other proposed amendment that continues to severely threaten
individual rights is the flag-burning amendment,157 designed to overrule
two Supreme Court decisions, Texas v. Johnson158 and United States v.
Eichman.159 In Johnson, the Court reversed the conviction of an individual
prosecuted under the Texas flag-desecration statute as a violation of his
first amendment right to free speech.160 In Eichman, the Court invalidated
Congress’s Flag Protection Act as an unconstitutional restraint on free
speech.161 The flag-burning amendment would grant to Congress the
power to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag.162 The Court
has held that even if the desecration of the flag is offensive to a majority of

155. See supra note 151 (concluding, based on the Supreme Court decision in Dred
Scott, that former or current slaves were not considered U.S. citizens and did not have the
rights and privileges that arise from citizenship).
156. See Strader, 51 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that state laws alone determine the status of
slavery and slaves and thus, once a lower court determines that a state law makes a person a
slave, “their judgment upon this point is . . . conclusive upon this court, and we have no
jurisdiction over it.”).
157. See H.R.J. Res. 10, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing the addition of an amendment to
the Constitution which would state, “[t]he Congress shall have power to prohibit the
physical desecration of the flag of the United States”); see also S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong.
(2005). The House approved this language on June 22, 2005, by a vote of 286-130. 151
CONG. REC. H4904, H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005). As of publication, the bill is
currently awaiting consideration by the Senate.
158. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
159. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
160. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that neither the state’s “interest in preserving
the flag as a symbol” nor its “interest in preventing breaches of the peace” justifies a
criminal conviction for burning the flag because it is an act of political expression).
161. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319 (“Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very
freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.”).
162. See supra note 157.
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citizens,163 it is also a powerful tool of expression.164 Moreover, free
expression is a fundamental principle embodied in the Bill of Rights and
thus trumps the government’s interest in enforcing the moral beliefs of the
majority.165 Justice Kennedy commented that the Court must, occasionally,
make a decision that it does not necessarily “like” in order to uphold the
basic principles underlying the Constitution.166
The flag-burning amendment has not yet been approved by both houses
of Congress, although it has come very close and in fact was recently
passed by the House of Representatives again.167 Scholars criticize the
proposed amendment as clearly in conflict with the express language of the
First Amendment.168 Furthermore, critics contend that the flag-burning
amendment is overly vague, invites unlimited prosecutorial discretion in its
application, abridges religious liberty along with free speech, and,
ironically, would be ineffective in stopping flag burning as a political
protest.169
Again, it is productive to compare the flag-burning amendment and the
FMA. First, these two amendments are similar in that they both seek to
restrict freedoms that are considered fundamental: the freedom of speech
and the freedom to marry. Just like the flag-burning amendment infringes
upon the right to speech, which lies as the bedrock of our democracy,170 the
163. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318 (acknowledging that Congress purportedly found a
national consensus favoring prohibition on flag burning).
164. See id. at 315 (observing that the government must, and in fact did, concede that
burning the flag constitutes expressive conduct).
165. See id. at 318 (rejecting the idea that the government has greater flexibility in
suppressing speech as public opposition to that speech grows).
166. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing that this case is a rare time where it is appropriate to recognize personal
distaste for a result that is “right” according to the principles of the Constitution).
167. See 151 CONG. REC. H4904, H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (containing the
most recent House vote approving the flag-burning amendment by a vote of 296-130); see
also Mike Allen, House Passes Constitutional Amendment to Ban Flag Burning, WASH.
POST, June 23, 2005, at A5 (announcing that the flag-burning amendment was passed in the
House of Representatives on June 22, 2005). This was the fifth time that the amendment
has passed the House and there is a new chance that the amendment may pass in the Senate
where it has narrowly been defeated each of the previous four times. Id.
168. See generally Rosen, supra note 63, at 1088-92 (concluding that the flag-burning
amendment was not only objectionable, but was actually unconstitutional because it would
limit otherwise inalienable rights); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
169. See Isaacson, supra note 80, at 600 (arriving at the conclusion that the flag-burning
amendment would not only restrict freedom, but it would not accomplish its purpose). This
conclusion is reached through the reasoning that, because the legally appropriate method of
disposing of a torn or soiled flag is to burn it, all that a protester would have to do is find
such a flag to burn. Id. at 584-87.
170. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (stating that freedom of
speech is a fundamental personal right and liberty); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that the Founding Fathers “believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.”); TRIBE, supra note 36, at 785-89 (describing free

SCHAFFNER OFFTOPRINTER

1514

2/24/2006 2:46:34 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1487

FMA is inconsistent with principles of liberty and equality. It is debatable
whether the FMA actually infringes individual rights to liberty and equality
because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether same-sex couples
have a right to marry.171 However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has already so decided.172
Even though the flag-burning amendment and the FMA are similar in
one respect, in many others the flag-burning amendment would actually be
less destructive of individual liberty interests than the FMA. First, the flagburning amendment restricts speech in a limited manner. The Supreme
Court has held that the right to free speech is not absolute; certain types of
speech are not protected, such as obscenity,173 defamation,174 and fighting
words.175 While the flag-burning amendment would limit citizens’ free
speech, it would do so in a relatively discrete fashion by targeting speech
most citizens reject as unworthy of protection.176 This is similar to other
classes of unprotected speech. In contrast, the FMA completely deprives
same-sex couples of the ability to marry and thus is arguably more
destructive of an individual interest than the flag-burning amendment.177
Second, while the flag burning amendment only affects individuals wanting
to criticize the government by burning the flag, it does not expressly target
a discrete and discernable class of individuals. In contrast, the FMA targets
same-sex couples, gay Americans, a class that has long suffered bias and
prejudice from the majority.178 Finally, state interests are not seriously
speech as a “basic element of our fundamental law” and outlining the basic elements of
several theories which support the significance of free speech). These theories included the
necessity of free speech in maintaining the “marketplace of ideas,” “self-government,” and
definition of personal and group identity. Id.
171. But see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that, “[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
172. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
limiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples violates “the basic premises of individual
liberty and equality”).
173. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding that the history
surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment rejects obscenity as “utterly without
redeeming social importance.”).
174. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952) (observing that every state
has made libel a crime and, like other forms of speech not protected by the Constitution, it is
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
175. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining “fighting
words” as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”).
176. But see Isaacson, supra note 80, at 563 (arguing that, because of the vagueness of
the term “desecration” and the undetermined scope of that word, the use of the word in the
amendment invites limitations on more forms of speech than contemplated).
177. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
178. See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (as
originally introduced, May 21, 2003) (proposing the initial language of the FMA).
The marriage amendment was first drafted as follows:
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infringed by the flag-burning amendment since it protects a federal interest.
In contrast, the marriage amendment deprives states of the right to establish
marriage laws by establishing a national definition of marriage.
III.

AMENDMENTS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS: AMENDMENTS
OVERRULING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The FMA defies separation of powers principles. The Framers
established three branches of government and provided for appropriate
checks and balances such that no branch may assume centralized power
and threaten the delicate balance created.179 The legislative branch is
granted the power to enact laws.180 The President is granted the power to
enforce those laws.181 The judiciary is granted the power to adjudicate
cases and controversies.182 The judiciary is the primary protector of
individual rights, and the sole protector of the rights of the “minority.”183
This branch is devoted to fairness, respect, and dignity for the individual

Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or
federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
Id. Not only would this language deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry but it
suggests that any status granted same-sex couples resembling marriage would be
unconstitutional as well. The language was then amended to read:
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
any union other than the union of a man and a woman.
Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004) (as amended, Sept. 23,
2004). This new language defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman but does
not prevent other recognition of same-sex couples. Thus, states are free to grant marital
benefits to same-sex couples, as Vermont has done, by creating civil unions or domestic
partnerships. See 1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 847 (2000) (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 1201-1207 (2000)) (creating the institution of a civil union and defining civil unions as
being between people of the same sex who are otherwise excluded from marriage laws).
Under the proposed amendment, states can prevent same sex couples from marrying. The
only difference is the name.
179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (“The men who met in Philadelphia
in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the
principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny.”).
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211-12 (extolling the ability of the
legislature to include a large number of individuals and diverse people and thoughts into the
lawmaking process, thus maximizing democracy and accountability).
181. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211
(emphasizing that the individual serving as the executive represents the most efficient and
rational way to achieve certain objectives and policy outcomes).
182. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
183. See Questions, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that the judiciary is “not intended to be
accountable to the people,” but rather is the only branch that protects the interests of the
minority of the people from discrimination).
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and makes decisions “based on normative and practical moral
reasoning.”184 Since 1803, the Supreme Court has been deemed the final
interpreter of the Constitution with the ability to review laws enacted by the
legislature to ensure they are consistent with constitutional principles.185
Because the judicial branch has the ultimate authority over constitutional
interpretation and construction, the only “check” on judicial power of
constitutional interpretation is the constitutional amendment process. The
amendment process should be used to overturn the Court only when it acts
beyond its powers or inconsistently with constitutional principles.
Otherwise, the careful balance of powers among the branches is
compromised.
The history of amending the Constitution to overrule Supreme Court
decisions is consistent with this view and is particularly relevant here.
While the U.S. Supreme Court is not being overturned by the FMA, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Goodridge decision is in jeopardy.
Goodridge was the catalyst for the fervor behind the proposed marriage
amendment. Moreover, the FMA will forever prevent the U.S. Supreme
Court from addressing the issue.
Only four constitutional amendments have been adopted to overrule the
Supreme Court.186 They are: (1) the Eleventh Amendment, which
overruled Chisolm v. Georgia;187 (2) the Thirteenth Amendment and, most
specifically, the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,188 which
overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford;189 (3) the Sixteenth Amendment, which

184. Id. at 212.
185. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) (“[I]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Interestingly, several
amendments to the Constitution have been proposed to alter the Supreme Court’s authority
in this area; not one has succeeded. MUSMANNO, supra note 31, at 92-95. Yet another
arguably unconstitutional bill in flagrant violation of Marbury was introduced in the House
in 2004 to allow Congress, if two thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of
the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.
Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108 Cong.
(2004).
186. See Thomas Baker, Towards a “More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts on
Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 9 n.37 (2000) (“Three other
amendments could be understood to impliedly reject earlier Supreme Court understandings
of the Constitution: The Seventeenth Amendment (1913) (direct election of Senators); the
Nineteenth Amendment (1920) (women’s suffrage); and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
(1964) (abolition of poll taxes in federal elections).”).
187. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
188. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are referred to as the Civil
War Amendments and were adopted, at least in part, in response to the Dred Scott decision.
See Baker, supra note 186, at 8. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and the
Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to the slaves, stating “all persons born or
naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
189. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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overruled Pollack v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.;190 and (4) the TwentySixth Amendment, which overruled Oregon v. Mitchell.191 As we will see,
each amendment was in harmony with the basic principles that underlie the
Constitution—individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism.
Moreover, in the cases where fundamental liberty interests were at stake,
the amendment reestablished individual rights in light of the Court’s
limited interpretation of those rights. Without analyzing the propriety of
the individual Supreme Court decisions, the following will demonstrate
that, unlike the FMA, the use of the amendment power to overrule these
cases was proper and consistent with basic democratic principles.
First, in Chisolm, the Court was called upon to interpret the scope of its
own jurisdictional power “extend[ing] . . . to Controversies between two or
more States;”192 specifically, whether such power authorized suits against a
State by a private citizen of another State.193 The Court held it had such
power.194 The anti-federalists were outraged by this decision, viewing it as
a direct threat to state sovereignty.195 Four years later the Senate
introduced the Eleventh Amendment to reverse the decision.196 The
Eleventh Amendment was a proper use of constitutional amendment
procedures to reign in the Court. In Chisolm, the Court broadly interpreted
its own authority pursuant to Article III in finding that federal courts had
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases brought by individuals against a state. A
decision by one branch to broadly construe its own powers197 is
problematic and thus using the amendment process to reign in the Court’s
authority is consistent with separation of powers principles. Moreover, the
Court’s decision directly threatened state sovereignty by allowing federal
courts to entertain suits by individuals against the state itself. Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment’s restraint of federal judicial power over the states
enforced federalism principles.
In contrast, the FMA is designed to overrule the Goodridge decision
which expanded the rights of individual citizens as against the state
190. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
191. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
193. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793) (“A general question of great
importance here occurs. What controversy of a civil nature can be maintained against a
State by an individual?”).
194. Id. at 455 (finding that a state is much like a person in that it can be bound by
contract, incur debts, own property, etc.).
195. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 102, at 14.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).
197. See Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 503 (1987) (defining this phenomenon as the “aggrandizement”
problem).
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legislature; Goodridge did not expand directly the court’s jurisdiction. Of
course, by finding a statute unconstitutional the court is trumping the
legislatures’ prerogative and thus arguably does threaten the delicate
balance between the judiciary and the legislature. However, as the
protector of individual rights as against an overreaching government, this is
an appropriate function of the judiciary. The FMA not only limits the
rights of individuals and replaces the court’s judgment with that of the
legislature, effectively expanding legislative authority and the delicate
balance among the branches, it threatens state sovereignty by setting a
national standard in an area exclusively retained by the states and is
inconsistent with federalism principles.
Second, in Dred Scott, the Court held that a federal court in Missouri had
no jurisdiction to hear Scott’s suit to win his freedom because Scott, as a
slave, was not a citizen of the United States, as “citizen” was understood at
the time the Constitution was ratified.198 Chief Justice Taney labored to
explain that there was no way to read the Constitution to interpret AfricanAmericans as citizens, largely because many founders themselves were
slave holders.199 The Court tirelessly canvassed the history of blacks
brought to this country as slaves and the views of the “people” toward the
slaves during colonial times, at the adoption of the Constitution, and during
the expansion of the territories. Justice Taney concluded that slaves were
never intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the
Constitution.200 He explained that states or territories that outlawed slavery
did so because slaves were ill-suited to the local economies and not
because the states or territories acknowledged a slave’s personhood.201 The
Court, however, invited an amendment to the Constitution stating:
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice,
the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question
belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the
sovereignty and framed the Constitution . . . . If any of its provisions are
deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by
which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption.202

Justice Charles P. Curtis resigned from the Court, in part because he
believed that the opinion had significantly damaged the Court’s stature.203
198. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1856).
199. See, e.g., id. at 410 (finding that if the Constitution included African-Americans as
citizens then many of the slave-owning founders acted in flagrant violation of their own
document); id. at 416-17 (recognizing that the large southern states could not have possibly
meant to include slaves within the meaning of the word “citizen”).
200. Id. at 404.
201. Id. at 438-39.
202. Id. at 405.
203. G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L.
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Others described Taney’s opinion as “an authorized registration of the
political heresies of the dominant party of the day” and suggested that the
primary effect of Dred Scott would be the “loss of confidence in the sound
judicial integrity and strictly legal character” of the Court.204
As a precedent, Dred Scott was remarkably short-lived. In June, 1862,
Congress abolished slavery in all the federal territories. Edward Bates,
President Abraham Lincoln’s Attorney General, issued an opinion late that
year declaring that free men of color born in the United States were citizens
of the United States. Three years later the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were passed, obliterating the last vestiges of Dred Scott.
The Dred Scott decision, perhaps one of the most notoriously “bad”
decisions in the Court’s history, enshrined the denigration of an entire class
of people, finding they were not citizens of this country but rather the
property of slave holders. While historically this may have been consistent
with the ideals of our ancestors, it clearly was a decision violating the
fundamental principles of human dignity, respect, liberty, and equality.
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments corrected this error by
abolishing slavery and granting slaves citizenship. Interestingly, even the
Court in Dred Scott recognized the Constitution was flawed in its
protection of slavery but felt itself bound by the document.205 However,
the Court suggested that Congress amend the Constitution to correct for
this problem.206 Thus, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were
not only consistent with principles of individual liberty and equality, they
were consistent with the Justices’ desires, if not their “official” decision,
and thus did not seriously threaten separation of powers principles. Of
course, the Thirteenth Amendment removed the power of the states to
allow slavery, and thus is inconsistent with the principle of states’ rights.
However, the need to establish national standards to protect individual
liberty interests and dignity far outweigh federalism concerns in this
situation.207
Third and similarly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which overruled
Mitchell and extended the right to vote to all citizens eighteen years or
older, expanded individual rights, and infringed slightly on the states’
freedom to establish their own voting age standards.208 In Mitchell, the
REV. 1463, 1510 (2003).
204. Id. (quoting Benjamin C. Howard).
205. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426 (noting that African slaves are an “unfortunate
race”).
206. Id.
207. William G. Ross, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? or Both? A Symposium in
Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733,
762 (2003) (stating that people are increasingly reliant on federal power to protect personal
liberties involving speech, religion, and sexual orientation).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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Justice Department, several states, and other interested parties challenged
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970209 that, among other things,
lowered the minimum age of voters in both state and federal elections from
twenty-one to eighteen.210 Many states refused to comply with the Act on
the basis that it “takes away from them the powers reserved to the States by
the Constitution to control their own elections.”211 The Court concluded
that Congress could set the age for voters for federal elections but could not
dictate such requirements for state or local elections.212 The Court found
that the Framers intended for the states to set their own voting criteria for
local and state elections as a means of maintaining a federalist structure of
government.213 Because only three states passed laws to allow eighteenyear olds to vote in state and local elections, Mitchell created dual voting
age requirements in most all states.214 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment
granting the right to all citizens eighteen years of age and older to vote in
all elections was proposed to remedy the anticipated confusion, fraud, and
costly administration of such a dual system.215
Whenever a federal constitutional amendment is designed to expand
individual rights of liberty and equal treatment under the law, thereby
setting a new federal floor for individual rights, the power of the state is
confined. For this reason, the Court in Dred Scott and Mitchell, to protect
its legitimacy, refused to interpret individual rights expansively against the
states with the expectation that Congress, the states, or the people would
act to “correct” its decisions and expand individual rights through a more
democratic process—constitutional amendment. It is appropriate and
consistent with democratic principles to set a new federal floor for
individual rights by a constitutional amendment overruling a Court decision
209. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 102, at 90.
210. The Amendments also barred the use of literacy tests in all state and federal
elections for a period of five years, which was based on a congressional finding that such
tests were used to discriminate against voters based on color. The Amendments further
forbade the states from disqualifying voters for presidential and vice presidential elections
because they had not met state residency requirements. Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285 (1970).
211. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
212. Id. at 125 (noting that Congress is the final authority in regulating federal elections).
213. Id. (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4). Justice Douglas, in concurrence, added
that the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supplied additional
justification for the holding that it was unfair to deny the right to vote to individuals who
could fight in wars. Id. at 141-42 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, argued that the power to set voter qualifications for national
elections was expressly committed to the states by article I, §§ 1 and 2 and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant the federal government the power to alter that without an express
constitutional amendment. Id. at 201 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Harlan criticized the majority for disregarding the express intent and understanding
of the Framers and invading the area to which Article V is committed. Id.
214. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 102, at 90.
215. Id.
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in which the Court felt restrained to expand those rights.
By contrast, the FMA has the opposite effect. It sets a new federal
ceiling for individual rights nationwide in response to one state court
expanding individual liberties. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
chose to interpret individual liberty interests more expansively than the
U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott or Mitchell, leaving itself open to
criticism of being “activist.”216 As a state court, interpreting the state
constitution, and affecting only its citizens, it is understandable why the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would interpret individual rights
more expansively than the U.S. Supreme Court, as its decision affects only
Massachusetts citizens.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge acted well
within its own authority as the final arbiter of its state constitution issuing a
very thoughtful, well-supported, rational decision, following the law,
setting a policy founded on equality, and protecting the interest of the
minority.217 The court held that the Massachusetts legislature has no
legitimate interest in denying two committed individuals a marriage license
solely because they are of the same sex.218 In fact, the court found that
such denial places same-sex families in jeopardy by depriving the couples
and their children important protections afforded opposite-sex couples.219
As the only institution devoted to protecting minority interests, its ruling
protecting those interests does not deserve to be overruled by constitutional
amendment.
The FMA is an inappropriate use of the amendment power designed to
prevent any other state court and the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing
this issue. Congress is limiting individual interests through a constitutional
amendment and substituting its judgment for the courts’ judgment. One
could argue that the FMA does no more than codify the current state of the
law and thus does not affect liberty interests at all. Because the Court has
not held that a federal right to same-sex marriage exists (at least not yet), it
is less of an affront on individual liberty than if the amendment removed a
216. In fact, opponents of gay marriage in Massachusetts filed a bill seeking to remove
Supreme Judicial Court Justice Margaret Marshall from the bench after a similar bill
targeting all four Massachusetts justices who voted to legalize gay marriage was proposed.
Opponents of gay marriage file bill to remove SJC chief justice, Associated Press, Boston,
May 25, 2004 (on file with the American University Law Review).
217. See Laurence Friedman, Symposium on Goodridge v. Department of Public Health:
The (Relative) Passivity of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
1, 22-25 (concluding that the decision in Goodridge is a narrow decision that does not
constitute judicial activism). See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(2003).
218. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
219. See id. at 963 (recognizing that, among other things, same-sex couples are denied
tax benefits of opposite-sex married couples and must undergo the difficult process of
second-parent adoption).

SCHAFFNER OFFTOPRINTER

1522

2/24/2006 2:46:34 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1487

right that the Court has already found to exist. Nevertheless, general
notions of liberty are broader than those found as rights in the Constitution;
and the more significant the interest at stake, the more suspect is an
amendment denying that interest.
Furthermore, while it is true that, historically, marriage has been the
union of a man and woman, marriage has changed in many respects over
time to accommodate evolving notions of liberty and equality.220 This
evolution generally takes place in the courts as individuals assert their
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.221 By freezing the current state
of the law through a constitutional amendment, such evolution is
impossible. Thus, the FMA redistributes the powers of the three branches
by denying the courts (as well as the states) the ability to decide this issue.
Through amendment, the legislative branch has the power to enact laws
that establish societal standards only so long as the laws enacted do not
violate the constitutional rights of individuals.222 The legislature is not
empowered to draft laws to enshrine illegitimate prejudices of the majority.
Allowing the legislature, with the endorsement of the executive, to amend
the Constitution to expressly overrule a decision of the judiciary, which
acted consistently with democratic principles by protecting the rights of a
minority of the people, destroys the delicate balance of power among the
branches.
Finally, in Pollock,223 the Court struck down an income tax amendment
to the Wilson Tariff Act adopted by Congress in 1894.224 Designed to help
solve the severe economic troubles of the late nineteenth century, those
who had opposed the income tax believed it to be socialistic and hostile to
free enterprise.225 The Court held the income tax was not apportioned and
thus unconstitutional in violation of art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4 of the Constitution,
which limits Congress’s power to impose a tax “unless in proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”226 The Court
stated that whether the income tax was desirable or not was a question for
the political branches and suggested that the political branches amend the
Constitution to allow for such a tax if politically desirable.227 In the early
220. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statutes violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (Article I of the Constitution
grants Congress broad power to legislate in certain areas. Those legislative powers are,
however, limited not only by the scope of the Framers’ affirmative delegation, but also by
the principle “that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions
of the Constitution.” (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)).
223. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
224. Id. at 634-35.
225. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 102, at 42.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
227. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635.
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twentieth century, Congress followed the Court’s suggestion and in 1913
the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted, stating: “The Congress shall have
the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.”228
Unlike the income tax, same-sex marriage is not a political question
better left to the majoritarian branches. Rather, it presents a question of
discrimination against a targeted minority, the type of question expressly
suited to the courts. The court in Goodridge, as the sole protector of
minority rights, protected the minority. The FMA is an illegitimate use of
the constitutional amendment process to overrule a court decision and
threatens separation of powers principles.
IV. AMENDMENTS AND FEDERALISM
Federalism principles define the allocation of power between the federal
and state governments. The federal government is one of “limited”
powers; the articles of the Constitution enumerate those powers.229 While
certain powers lie within the exclusive domain of the federal government,
most of the enumerated powers are shared with the states.230 The Tenth
Amendment reserves all powers not expressly delegated to the federal
government to the states or to the people.231
Federalism principles serve a very important function by allowing the
experimentation of developing ideals at the state level without affecting the
entire union.232 In this manner, “new” ideals are tested before they are
adopted nationwide or refuted, and individuals have the choice to live in a
state that protects the liberty interests important to them.233 The states, of
course, may not reduce individual liberties below the floor established by
the federal government,234 but they are free to expand upon them.235 In
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (delineating the specific powers of Congress); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2 (delineating the specific powers of the President); U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2; U.S. CONST. amend. X (delineating the specific powers of the Judiciary).
230. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (noting that the
Constitution created a system of dual sovereignty).
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
232. See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
233. See Peter A. Lauricella, The Real “Contract with America”: The Original Intent of
the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (1997)
(“[B]ecause the geographical area of a state is smaller than that of the federal government,
people who find state policies and regulations burdensome could ‘vote with their feet,’ and
move to a different state.”).
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI (highlighting the Supremacy Clause).
235. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (“[S]tate courts are absolutely free to
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fact, once there is sufficient “experimentation” within the states, the federal
government may step in and provide all citizens of the United States the
liberties granted by the “experimenting” states by establishing a new
federal floor for individual rights.236
An amendment that infringes on fundamental state powers is highly
destructive of state sovereignty and inconsistent with federalism principles.
Domestic relations are traditionally an exclusive state power.237 The
authority to define “marriage” falls exclusively with the states as perhaps
the most central aspect of domestic relations.238 The Constitution grants no
power to the federal government to define marriage or grant marriage
licenses to the people. State civil marriage is exactly that, a state (not
federal) civil (not religious) institution. All couples are married pursuant to
state authority, and the federal government merely agrees to acknowledge
those marriages for federal purposes.239 Moreover, while there are separate
institutions for religious marriage, civil institutions are not dependent upon,
nor should they be influenced by, religious tenets.240
The FMA would force all states to define marriage as the union of a man
and a woman; depriving any state of the ability to deviate from that
definition independent of the state’s interest or policy. This power is
outside the scope of any existing power granted to the federal government.
interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than
do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.”).
236. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing numerous incidents in which states have pioneered
policies, like the minimum wage in Massachusetts, that eventually became national policy).
237. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to
the laws of the United States.”); see also Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act
and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1467 (1997).
238. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000) (“With its careful
enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the
Federal Government are reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as
granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.”); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the Federal Government to take
over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do
with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal
and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”).
Interestingly, in 1884 the first attempt to give Congress the power to make uniform marriage
and divorce laws was made, followed by fifty-nine proposed amendments toward that end.
Edwin Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution
Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 637, 666 app. (2004). All, of course, have
failed, as an extreme encroachment on states’ powers. Id. at 638, 664-65.
239. See generally Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act:
Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419 (1999) (concluding that
Congress does not have the power to impose its definition of marriage on the states).
240. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (2003) (distinguishing civil
and religious marriages); see also Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next
Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2704-05 (2004) (stating that
the government’s ability to regulate marriage is limited to civil, as opposed to religious,
marriages).
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Because the FMA is designed to limit rather than protect individual
liberties, the use of federal power here is illegitimate and infringes upon a
fundamental power of the states. Moreover, by trumping state authority in
this way, the benefit of having states experiment with new laws is
nullified.241
A. State Experimentation
States have experimented with the definition of marriage over the years,
demonstrating the usefulness of such experimentation. The most obvious
parallel to the same-sex marriage debate is the history of antimiscegenation statutes in this country. Long ago citizens began challenging
state anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed the marriage between
individuals of different races.242 In 1852, Maine became one of the first
states to uphold the constitutionality of an anti-miscegenation statute and
declare interracial marriages null and void.243 It was not until 1948 that
California became the first state to declare its anti-miscegenation statute
unconstitutional.244 During the next twenty years, cases were brought in
other states challenging similar anti-miscegenation statutes and several
successfully invalidated them.245 However, it was not until 1967, when the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia that no state could deny two
people a marriage license merely because they were of different races. The
Court held that this denial violated federal constitutional principles of
liberty and equality.246 Loving thus set a new federal floor for individual
rights throughout the nation. Interestingly, these events never would have
transpired had the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment been ratified.247
241. See Letter from Dennis W. Archer, President, American Bar Association, to U.S.
Senators (July 9, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (“If the
Constitution is to continue to embody the spirit of liberty for future generations, we must not
seek to use it to enshrine still-evolving societal views.”), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/108th/cam070904.pdf.
242. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (naming the fifteen states which
still had anti-miscegenation statutes or constitutional provisions in force in 1967).
243. See Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 77 (1852) (nullifying a fifty-nine year marriage
between a white woman and a mulatto); see also Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell:
Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
559, 592-97 (2000) (describing the history of courts upholding the constitutionality of antimiscegenation statutes prior to 1967).
244. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (finding the statute unconstitutional
under the California state constitution); see also Sealing, supra note 243, at 593 n.239
(noting that the Alabama Supreme Court was actually the very first to overturn an antimiscegenation statute in Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872), but the decision was overruled
in Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877)).
245. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5 (“Over the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws
outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.”).
246. See id. at 12 (finding that the state statutes violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
247. For a more detailed discussion of the proposed amendment, see supra Part III.B.
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A similar history with regard to same-sex marriage is developing in our
lifetime. The very first challenge to state marriage laws that deprived
same-sex couples of a right to marry was brought in Minnesota.248 In 1971,
the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the challenge and the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal.249 For many years, same-sex
couples challenged similar statutes in other states and lost.250
However, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that denying samesex couples a right to marry amounted to sex-based discrimination and
violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the Hawaii Constitution unless
the state could justify the discriminatory treatment.251 On remand, the
Hawaii trial judge found that the state failed to justify the discriminatory
treatment and held the state statute violated the equal rights of same-sex
partners.252 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Hawaii for a
second time253 and, while on appeal, the state legislature passed two laws:
(1) a Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act—granting couples ineligible to marry,
certain basic benefits,254 and (2) a proposed constitutional amendment
stating that the Hawaii legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage
for opposite-sex couples.255 In 1998, the citizens of Hawaii approved the
state constitutional amendment.256
Meanwhile, same-sex couples in the state of Vermont were challenging
the Vermont marriage laws, which denied same-sex couples marriage
licenses. The challengers argued that the Vermont marriage laws violated
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.257 In 1999, the
248. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW
1064 (2d ed. 2004).
249. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
250. See, e.g., Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 308 (D.C. 1995) (affirming
denial of marriage license to two gay men); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky.
1973) (holding that two women are “incapable” of being married); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1197 (Wash. App. 1974), review dismissed, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974) (denying
marriage license to same-sex couple).
251. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
252. Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
253. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
254. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C (2004).
255. Brad K. Gushiken, The Fine Line Between Love and the Law: Hawaii’s Attempt to
Resolve the Same-Sex Marriage Issue, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 149, 165 (2000).
256. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. This constitutional amendment is arguably suspect for
many of the same reasons articulated in this Article. Of course, federalism principles are
not invoked when dealing with a state statute but individual rights and separation of powers
principles clearly are. The political branches in Hawaii used the amendment process to
overturn a judicial decision that had protected the interests of a small minority and enshrined
prejudice in the state constitution. See generally David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i
Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 18, 70-82 (2000)
(detailing the legislative action leading to the approval of the 1998 Marriage Amendment).
257. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 869-70 (Vt. 1999) (noting that the marriage laws
“effectively exclude[d] them from a broad array of legal benefits and protections incident to
the marital relation, including access to a spouse’s medical, life, and disability insurance,
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Vermont Supreme Court agreed and held that same-sex couples in Vermont
are entitled to the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law
to married opposite-sex partners.258 The Court did not find that the denial
of a marriage license violated the constitution but rather the denial of the
benefits associated with a marriage license did.259 The court instructed the
Vermont legislature to craft an appropriate means for granting the same
marital benefits to same-sex couples as enjoyed by opposite-sex couples.260
In April 2000, the Vermont Legislature created civil unions for such
couples.261
The Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
November, 2003 is the most recent attempt by a state appellate court to
expand the rights of same-sex couples.262 That court held that same-sex
couples have a right to marry (not just a right to benefits), and that any
separate but equal solution would be unconstitutional under the
Massachusetts Constitution.263 In other words, the court held that a civil
union recognizing same-sex couples and granting identical benefits is not
constitutionally adequate in Massachusetts.264 The court directed the
Massachusetts legislature to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples on May 17, 2004.265 The Governor of Massachusetts requested a
stay from the Court while the legislature attempted to pass an amendment
to the Massachusetts Constitution, but the request was not granted.266 The
first same-sex couples were married in Massachusetts on May 17, 2004.267
hospital visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges, spousal support, intestate
succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory protections.”).
258. Id. at 867.
259. See id. at 886 (leaving the issue of a same-sex couple’s right to a marriage license
for another day).
260. Id.
261. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2004).
262. Recently California and New York trial courts have held their state marriage laws
depriving same-sex couples a marriage license unconstitutional under their state
constitutions. See In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 155(c)], 2005 WL
583129 (Cal. Sup. Ct, 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc.3d 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
But see Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (“the limitation of
marriage licenses to opposite sex couples does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights”).
263. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 343-44 (2003).
264. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004)
(finding that there was no rational basis for distinguishing between “civil marriages” and
“civil unions” where the only difference between the licensure programs was the sexual
orientation of the recipients).
265. Id. at 568.
266. See Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban: Romney to Seek Stay
of SJC Order, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2004, at A1 (explaining that the Attorney General
of Massachusetts refused to take the Governor’s request to the Supreme Judicial Court
because he believed it lacked legal merit). Moreover, some citizens requested an injunction
in federal court and were also denied. Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for State of Mass.,
313 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004).
267. See Fred Bayles, Mass. to Allow Gay Marriage Today, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004,
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When the federal government attempts to step in and cut-off the debate
among the states, by setting a federal ceiling on individual rights
nationwide, it destroys a central purpose of our dual state and federal
system and, worse, enshrines inequality and prejudice into our
Constitution.268
B. Protecting States from Activist Sister States
The federal government has an interest in protecting the states from each
other. In other words, each state is a separate sovereign, and no state can
infringe the sovereignty of the other states.269 The proponents of the
marriage amendment claim there is a legitimate need to amend the federal
constitution to protect states from the “activist” judges of other states, like
those in Massachusetts. They also argue that to allow individual states to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples will place all other states in the
position of having to recognize those marriages and to grant benefits to the
couples in violation of their public policy.270
This claim is misleading and unrealistic. The Goodridge decision and
the marriage licenses granted in Massachusetts affect no other state nor the
federal government directly.271 Albeit indirectly, each state’s laws affect
at A1 (reporting that thousands of homosexual couples in Massachusetts were expected to
apply for marriage licenses).
268. Justice Brandeis stated many years ago that to deny the states the right to
experiment with social institutions is “fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.”
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also SECTION OF FAMILY LAW WORKING GROUP ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND NONMARITAL CIVIL UNIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A WHITE PAPER: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW REGARDING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
passim (2004) (analyzing the issues surrounding same-sex unions throughout the country
and contending that the states are best suited to vigorously address the issues); Dennis
Archer, Why Congress Should Back Off Gay Marriage Law: It Tramples on the Traditional
Authority of Each State to Establish its Own Laws, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Op-ed, July 14, 2004
(providing a warning of the dangerous impact a constitutional amendment on same-sex
marriage would have on the federalist structure of our government), available at
http://www.suntimes.com.
269. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“The several States are of equal
dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is laid down . . . that the laws of one State have no operation outside its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity . . . .”).
270. See Susan Milligan, Lawmakers Voice Concerns for States’ Rights, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 25, 2004 (“Many senators and House members said they are distressed about the
domino effect of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision requiring the state to
sanction same-sex marriages, and worried aloud that ‘activist judges’ would demand that all
states recognize gay unions made in Massachusetts beginning in May and others licensed
recently in San Francisco and Bernalillo, N.M., contrary to state laws.”), available at
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/
2004/02/25/lawmakers_voice_concern_for_states_rights/.
271. In fact, a 1913 Massachusetts statute is being used to prevent out-of-state couples
from getting married in Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 12 (1913) (“Legal
ability of non-residents to marry; duty of licensing officer to ascertain: Before issuing a
license to marry a person who resides and intends to continue to reside in another state, the
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every other state and the federal government.
The Full Faith and Credit (“FF&C”) Clause of the Constitution defines
the credit that each state must grant to other states’ legal acts and protects
the states from overreaching sister states.272 The FF&C Clause was drafted
to reconcile the desire for diversity among the states with mutual respect
for differences of opinion.273 While the clause states that each state must
give FF&C to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the other
states,274 it is not absolute. The Supreme Court recognizes various
exceptions to the generalized requirement of mutual respect, most notably
when recognizing a judgment by a sister state that the home state finds
fundamentally objectionable.275 In fact, it was common during the period
when the anti-miscegenation statutes were being challenged for states not
to recognize interracial marriages granted in other states on the basis that
those marriages were odious, against the will of God and public policy, and
an attempt by citizens to avoid their home state’s restrictive marriage
laws.276 Thus, there is precedent to support the idea that states need not
recognize same-sex marriages granted in sister states if they are deemed
contrary to that state’s public policy.277
Moreover, the federal legislature has already acted to protect states from
sister states that have decided to permit same-sex marriages. In 1996, after
the Hawaii Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage was announced,
the federal government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)
granting the states the power to refuse recognize a same-sex marriage
entered into in another state.278 Many states followed suit and enacted their
officer having authority to issue the license shall satisfy himself, by requiring affidavits or
otherwise, that such person is not prohibited from intermarrying by the laws of the
jurisdiction where he or she resides.”).
272. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
273. See, e.g., Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1951) (stating that the Full
Faith and Credit clause gives states power over their own courts, but demands that they
respect the decisions of courts in other states).
274. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
275. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501
(1939) (making an exception for employee compensation statutes); see generally Barbara J.
Cox, Same-sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does it Really
Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996) (discussing whether same-sex marriages should fit
into the public policy exception).
276. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry in
Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1110-16
(comparing choice-of-law treatment with regard to anti-miscegenation statutes to the
potential treatment of legalized same-sex marriages).
277. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, The Law of Marriage and Family,
Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2028, 2029, 2039-42 (2003) (evaluating the merit of the argument that states may
categorically refuse to recognize same-sex marriages consummated in other states based on
the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit clause).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States,
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own statutes refusing to recognize same-sex marriages.279 These state
statutes are designed to support states’ claims, under the FF&C Clause, that
recognition of same-sex marriages would violate a fundamental state policy
interest.
There are strong arguments that the federal DOMA statute is
unconstitutional.280 The primary argument for challenging DOMA is that
the Act “is the antithesis of a full faith and credit measure which lacks
sufficient generality and, without adequate justification, encroaches upon
an area traditionally reserved for state regulation.”281 In mid-July 2004, the
first suit challenging a state’s power to refuse recognition of a valid
Massachusetts same-sex marriage was filed in Florida.282 The plaintiffs

or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”).
279. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2004) (“Marriages between persons of
the same sex . . . are not recognized for any purpose in this state.”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/212 n.4 (West 1996) (“[S]ame sex marriage is contrary to the public policy of this
state.”) (internal quotations omitted); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001) (“A
marriage between persons of the same sex . . . even if valid where entered into, shall be void
in this Commonwealth.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon 2003) (“A marriage
between persons of the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of this state
and is void in this state.”). For a particularly far-reaching statute, see Virginia’s recent
amendment to its marriage statutes which reads in pertinent part:
The General Assembly finds that the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law.” (Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, (1901), reversed on
other grounds under Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, (1906)). The General
Assembly further recognizes that both the United States Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2472, (2003), and the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Goodrich v. Department of Health, SJC 08860, March 4, 2003November 18, 2003, failed to consider the beneficial health effects of heterosexual
marriage, as contrasted to the life-shortening and health compromising
consequences of homosexual behavior, and this to the detriment of all citizens
regardless of their sexual orientation or inclination.
The General Assembly hereby concludes that the Commonwealth of Virginia is
under no constitutional or legal obligation to recognize a marriage, civil union,
partnership contract or other arrangement purporting to bestow any of the
privileges or obligations of marriage under the laws of another state or territory of
the United State unless such marriage conforms to the laws of this Commonwealth.
H.B. 751, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004).
280. See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (arguing that DOMA should be struck down
because it violates the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution); see also Mark
Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full
Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1998) (asserting that
DOMA is unconstitutional).
281. Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage
and the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 279 (1997).
282. Wilson v. Ake, No. 8:04-CV-1680-T-30TBM, 2004 WL 3142528 (M.D. Fl. July
20, 2004), argued, Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (2005) (granting defendants’
motion to dismiss); see Graham Brink, Couple Sues to Recognize Gay Wedding, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 21, 2004, at 1A.
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sought declaratory judgment that Florida’s and the federal government’s
refusal to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license violated their
fundamental rights of equal protection and due process, the FF&C Clause,
the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, and the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.283 Although the court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss, proponents of the FMA use the possible success of such suits to
strengthen their contention that the marriage amendment is necessary. If
DOMA is struck down as unconstitutional, it is incapable of protecting
states from the acts of sister states. However, even if DOMA were held
unconstitutional, the FF&C clause arguably allows states to decline to
recognize marriages that are against their states’ public policy, providing
sufficient protection to state sovereignty.284
C. Protecting the Federal Government from Activist States
Although the federal government has no direct power over the marital
institution, the federal government recognizes state marriages and grants
many federal benefits to spouses as defined by state law.285 Thus, the
federal government does have an interest in the definition of statesanctioned marriages. DOMA was enacted to protect this federal interest
by denying federal recognition to same-sex marriages recognized in any
state.286 DOMA is arguably unconstitutional as “the Act unreasonably
restricts interstate travel and is motivated by a desire to impose an
undeserved burden on a disfavored group.”287 If found unconstitutional by
283. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
284. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979) (holding that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require a forum state to apply another state’s laws if such laws
violate a legitimate public policy of the forum state); see also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416, 426 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is true that the commands of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause are not inexorable in the sense that exceptional circumstances may
relieve a State from giving full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State because
‘obnoxious’ to an overriding policy of its own”); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 264 (1998) (“If Congress does not provide for the substantive
effect that state statutes should have in other states, the states would determine these matters
for themselves under common-law, conflict-of-laws rules reflecting accepted relationships
between independent sovereigns.”).
285. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO
PRIOR REPORT (2004) (stating that the U.S. General Accounting Office has counted “1,138
federal statutory provisions . . . in which marital status is a factor in determining or
receiving benefits, rights, and privileges”); see also Religious Tolerance.org, Legal and
Economic Benefits of Marriage, at http://www.religioustoleranc
e.org/mar_bene.htm (last visited July 17, 2005) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (discussing some of the many federal legal rights and benefits currently unavailable
to same-sex couples).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
287. Strasser, supra note 281, at 279; see Barbara A. Robb, The Constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263, 342
(1997) (concluding that both sections of DOMA are unconstitutional under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause in light of Romer v.
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the Supreme Court, a constitutional amendment is likely the only
mechanism to overrule the Court’s finding.
The House, fearful of this possibility, voted to approve “The Marriage
Protection Act of 2004,”288 which would strip federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear challenges to DOMA and introduced the Congressional
Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004,289 to allow Congress, if
two thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S.
Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.
Opponents claim both statutes are unconstitutional as a direct violation to
the jurisdictional authority granted the federal courts by the Constitution
and in opposition to the centuries old Supreme Court case of Marbury v.
Madison290 and Ex parte McCardle.291
In sum, amending the federal constitution to set a ceiling on individual
liberty and equality interests and to dictate to every state of the union that a
marriage must be defined as between a man and a woman infringes upon a
power exclusively retained by the states. Moreover, it prevents the states
from serving their unique function of experimentation, and defies the
principle of federalism. The very same conservatives who rally for states’
rights292 when it suits their political agenda now demand that all states treat
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
288. See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (amending 28
U.S.C. § 1632 to read “[n]o court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question
pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of section 1738C of
this section.”).
289. H.R. 3920, 108th Cong. (2004).
290. See 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is “emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is”); see also Press Release, Alan Hirsch,
Williams Project, Off the Court (July 15, 2004), at http://www.law.ucla.edu/
williamsproj/press/offthecourthirsch071504.html (on file with the American University Law
Review) (noting that proponents of the bill argue that it is constitutional under Article III as
the federal courts’ jurisdiction is subject to “such exceptions, and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make” while opponents argue that the “exceptions clause was never
intended to permit stripping all federal courts of authority to hear cases arising under the
Constitution or federal law, especially where fundamental rights are concerned.”). See
generally William G. Ross, The Resilience of Marbury v. Madison: Why Judicial Review
Has Survived So Many Attacks, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (2003) (commenting on the
failure of most legislative attempts to curb judicial review as reason for the heated
controversies in the judicial appointments process judicial antagonists); Wilfred Feinberg,
Constraining the “Least Dangerous Branch”: The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial Power,
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252 (1984) (discussing legislative attempts to limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts and noting that nearly all have failed).
291. 74 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1868) (detailing the first Supreme Court case interpreting
Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). See generally Gordon G.
Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict
the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132 (1995) (examining the
constitutionality of laws limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
292. See CONG. REC. S7998-99 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain on
Senate floor during the 2004 debate over the Federal Marriage Amendment) (“The
constitutional amendment we’re debating today strikes me as antithetical in every way to the
core philosophy of Republicans. It usurps from the states a fundamental authority they have
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gay citizens unfairly and inequitably. Moreover, every attempt by
Congress to achieve the same result short of a constitutional amendment is
itself arguably unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Constitution is an amazing and versatile document and has
served this country well for over 200 years. The Constitution has been
amended since its adoption, but successful amendments have been
consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the Framers’ purposes.
The FMA is not: the FMA is in direct conflict with fundamental principles
for which our democracy stands: individual rights, separation of powers,
and federalism. Moreover, the FMA will not protect the marital institution,
instead it will enshrine bigotry and inequality in the Constitution.

always possessed and imposes a Federal remedy for a problem that most states do not
believe confronts them . . . .”).

